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I. Introduction
During the last year or so, international organizations and governments have focused
increasingly on extending anti-money laundering legislation to cover additional persons,
products, and situations, while developing strategies and mechanisms to implement and
enforce anti-money laundering laws and conventions. As politicians struggle to explain the
inability to effectively control the growth of transnational crime and organized crime
groups, the rhetoric and efforts to develop an international money movement enforcement
regime have increased.
In 1999 and 2000, governments and international organizations continued their active
efforts to increase regulatory and criminal enforcement of various laws to stem the tide of
transnational crime. These efforts were reflected in the criminalization of various business
and financial transactions (as reflected in the signing by at least 124 countries during the
week of December 12-15, 2000 of the Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime'), the imposition of new due diligence measures on the private sector and the con-
comitant weakening of privacy and confidentiality laws, strengthened penalties for non-
compliance with regulatory efforts against the private sector and governments, and new law
enforcement techniques (e.g., undercover sting operations, wiretapping, expanded powers
to search homes and businesses, and controlled deliveries).
In particular, a major development in 2000 was the almost simultaneous issuance of
blacklists against non-compliant organizations. Within a one-month period, the Organi-
zation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) issued its harmful tax com-
petition initiative with a list of tax havens that did not agree to make a public commitment
to bring their practices into compliance; the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) issued its
report on offshore financial centers (OFC), classifying OFCs into three levels of compliance
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1. United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, opened for signature Dec. 12, 2000,
U.N. Doc. A/55/383, available at http://www.odccp.org/palermo/convmain.html.
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with international standards; and the Financial Action Task Force on Anti-Money Laun-
dering (FATF) issued its list of fifteen non-complying countries.
Much of the emphasis of the politics of international anti-money laundering is to try to
deprive criminals, especially transnational criminals and organized crime, of the fruits of
their crimes and the means of their committing more crimes. Another goal is to allocate
the seized proceeds to governments and law enforcement. Hence, the economics and poli-
tics of anti-money laundering are to redistribute the economics and power of crime. To
help with the fight, governments and international organizations have solicited the col-
laboration of the private sector to prevent money laundering through know-your-customer
programs and by identifying and reporting to law enforcement suspicious transactions.
The implications for international business planning are that financial institutions and
their employees, and increasingly professionals, are on the front-line and responsible for
increased due diligence (e.g., to know their clients, and to identify and report suspicious
transactions). Some of the confidentiality that clients have come to expect is greatly eroded
by the know-your-customer requirements to identify and report suspicious transactions and
far-reaching enforcement cooperation agreements (i.e., Mutual Assistance in Criminal Mat-
ters Treaties and tax information exchange provisions). The implications for national gov-
ernments and international organizations include the establishment of a new enforcement
regime with new substantive and procedural laws and new institutions, such as the Financial
Investigative Unit (FILU).
This article addresses trends in international anti-money laundering developments dur-
ing the last couple of years.
II. Developments of International Organizations
Multilateral organizations have set the framework for anti-money laundering standards,
mechanisms, and institutions.2 The U.N. pioneered the 1988 Vienna Convention against
the Trafficking in Illegal Narcotic and Psychotropic Substances,3 which contains the re-
quirements to criminalize money laundering and immobilize the assets of persons involved
in illegal narcotics trafficking.
In 1989, the G-7 Economic Summit Group established the FATF, which operates out of
the OECD headquarters in Paris. The FATF has issued a set of Forty Recommendations
that concern legal requirements, financial and banking controls, and external affairs. 4 It
operates through regional groups in the Caribbean and more recently has established a
similar group in Asia. The FATF and its regional counterparts issue an annual report that
provides an overview of progress and problems in international anti-money laundering and
an additional report on topologies and trends in laundering prevention and enforcement
techniques. In addition, the G-10 Basle Group of Central Banks has actively provided
guidelines for central bank supervisors and regulatory controls.
2. For background on the role of the international organizations, see Bruce Zagaris & Sheila M. Castilla,
Constructing an International Financial Enforcement Subregime: The Implementation ofAnti-Money-LaunderingPol-
icy, 19 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 871, 882-907 (1993).
3. United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, G.A.
Res. 47/97, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. (No. 49) at 179, U.N. Doc. A/47/49 (1992).
4. Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, The Forty Recommendations of the FinancialAction Task
Force on Money Laundering (Feb. 7, 1990), available at http://www.oecd.org/fatf.
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With respect to regional developments of international organizations, the Council of
Europe's 1991 Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of Assets, has
become the major international convention that obligates signatory governments to co-
operate against anti-money laundering from all serious crimes. The European Union, as a
signatory to the Convention, and due to its own actions to combat financial crimes against
the Communities, issued the 1991 Anti-Money Laundering Directive6 that likely will be
revised and extended during mid-2001.
The Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) has provided its own
recommendations. At its meeting on November 4-7, 1997, CICAD anti-money laundering
experts recommended an ongoing assessment of compliance with standards and the creation
of national FIUs. National governments and international organizations are striving to
create mechanisms to regularly monitor compliance with international standards.
Increasingly, international organizations have cooperated and helped one another in for-
mulating and implementing anti-money laundering strategy as well as developing an overall
strategy vis-a-vis offshore financial centers. Because the recent FATF annual reports and
topologies provide cutting edge discussions of the status of money laundering trends, they
are discussed next.
International organizations issued three reports within three months of each other that
cumulatively exerted significant pressure on many offshore financial centers. On April 5,
2000, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) published a list ranking twenty-five leading OFCs
according to their levels of compliance with international standards of supervision and
transparency.' On June 22, 2000, the FATF issued a review identifying non-cooperative
jurisdictions on anti-money laundering.8 And on June 26, 2000, the Committee on Fiscal
Affairs (CFA) of the OECD issued a report listing thirty-five jurisdictions that have been
determined to be "tax havens" and have not made a commitment to bring their practices
into compliance with the recommendations of the CFA.9
A. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE
On February 14, 2000, the FATF issued a report establishing a process to sanction non-
cooperative jurisdictions. 0
1. Background
The FATF explains that in recent years there has been a sharp increase in the number
of jurisdictions offering financial services without appropriate control or regulation and
5. Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime, opened fr
signature Nov. 8, 1990, available at http://www.conventions.coe.intrTreaty/EN/CadreListeTraites.htm.
6. Council Directive 91/308/EEC, 1991 OJ. (L 166), p. 77.
7. Financial Stability Forum, Report of the Working Group Offshore Centres (Apr. 5, 2000), available at
http://www.fsforum.org/Reports/RepOFC.pdf.
8. Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Review to Identify Non-Cooperative Countries or Ter-
ritories: Increasing the Worldwide Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (June 22, 2000), available at
http://www.oecd.org/fatf [hereinafter Review to Identify Nan-Cooperative Countries or Territories].
9. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Report to the 2000 Ministerial CouncilMeet-
ing and Recommendations by the Committee an Fiscal Affairs (une 26, 2000), available at http://www.oecd.org.
10. Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Report of the FATF on Non-Cooperative Countries and
Territories (Feb. 14, 2000), available at http://www.oecd.org/fatf; see aho Financial Action Task Force on Money
Laundering, The FinancialAction Task Force Publishes a Report on Non-Cooperative Jurisdictions in the International
Fight Against Money Laundering (Feb. 14, 2000), available at http://www.oecd.org/fatf.
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protected by strict bank secrecy. The proliferation of these new jurisdictions and products,
along with the high mobility of funds and the rapid development of new payment tech-
nologies, has provided new means for laundering proceeds of serious crimes. The report
explains that, to ensure the stability of the international financial system and effective pre-
vention of money laundering, all financial centers must have comprehensive control, regu-
lation, and supervision systems. All financial intermediaries or agents must be subject to
strict obligations, especially as regards the prevention, detection, and punishment of money
laundering.
FATF members will first identify the detrimental rules and practices that impair the
effectiveness of their money laundering prevention and detection systems, as well as the
results of their judicial inquiries in order to determine criteria for defining the non-
cooperative countries or territories. The FATF prepared a list of countries and territories
that meet the criteria, which are contained in both Part I and the Annex of the report.
FATF members have agreed on a process for identifying the non-cooperative jurisdictions
and on the necessary international action to encourage compliance by the identified non-
cooperative jurisdictions. FATF members agreed on countermeasures to protect their econ-
omies against money from unlawful sources.
On June 22, 2000, the FATF released a review identifying non-cooperative jurisdictions
on anti-money laundering." The fifteen jurisdictions that were found non-cooperative are:
the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands, the Cook Islands, Dominica, Israel, Lebanon, Liechten-
stein, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Panama, the Philippines, Russia, St. Kitts and
Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Countries or jurisdictions investigated and
found to adhere to the majority of the twenty-five stated FATF criteria are: Antigua
and Barbuda, Belize, the British Virgin Islands, Cyprus, Gibraltar, Guernsey, the Isle of
Man, Jersey, Malta, Mauritius, Monaco, Samoa, and St. Lucia. 2
The review also revealed a number of issues that arose in several jurisdictions and raised
questions of interpretation. The following is a summary of the issues:
(1) The practice in some jurisdictions of an "indirect obligation" to report suspicious trans-
actions related to some criminal offenses, whereby reporting provides a defense against a
charge of money laundering, rather than requiring a direct obligation to report;
(2) The practice in some jurisdictions of permitting intermediaries to introduce businesses to
banks and financial institutions where the obligation to verify customer identity was an
obligation for the introducer rather than of the bank;
(3) Difficulties in establishing the beneficial ownership of some legal entities, including com-
panies issuing bearer shares or being owned by trusts;
(4) The existence and development of IBCs, which can be formed by intermediaries and be
subject to less verification and disclosure requirements rather than applied to the company
sector as a whole; and
(5) The lack of a strict regime to apply the new rules of customer identification for accounts
open prior to their entry into force.13
Because the FATF believes these five general issues require further clarification, it will start
dialogue with concerned jurisdictions to discuss their implications, including the possibility
11. See Review to Identify Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories, supra note 8.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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of changing their laws and practices. 4 Hence, the FATF's review may result in some revi-
sions in the substance of international money laundering standards.
In the future, if the fifteen listed jurisdictions maintain their detrimental rules and prac-
tices despite the encouragement to make certain reforms, FATF members will need to
consider the adoption of countermeasures (e.g., economic sanctions). The FATF will place
on the agenda of each plenary meeting the issue of non-cooperative jurisdictions, to monitor
any progress that may occur, and to revise its findings, including removal of jurisdictions'
names from the list. The FATF will continue to monitor weaknesses in the global financial
system that could be exploited for money laundering purposes. This will lead to more
jurisdictions being examined and future reports updating the FATF findings in relation to
these matters."
Austria escaped the list because of its progress on legislation abolishing anonymous sav-
ings passbook accounts although other countries on the list (e.g., the Bahamas) had initiated
legislation to correct the offending deficiencies. The FATF review was thought courageous
by some observers because of its criticism and listing of larger countries, such as Israel and
Russia. Russia has figured in many major laundering cases.' 6
The way in which FATF countries implement the warning of national financial institu-
tions to give special attention to business relations and transactions with persons in non-
cooperative jurisdictions will be very important regarding the immediate and short-term
impact as well as the success of the warnings in stimulating action in the so-called non-
cooperative jurisdictions.
On June 15, 2000, the FATF issued a press release welcoming the "clear political com-
mitment" by the Austrian government to abolish anonymous passbooks in accordance with
a decision earlier this year by the FATF plenary meeting. 7 It welcomed the introduction
of a bill into Austria's Parliament to amend the Banking Act and its adoption by the First
Chamber of the Austrian Parliament on June 7, 2000.
On February 1, 2001, during a presentation of its annual report, the FATF announced
it was "not yet satisfied" that any of the fifteen jurisdictions cited for non-cooperation in
the June 2000 FATF report had sufficiently rectified the gaps to be taken off the list.I,
According to the FATF, seven jurisdictions on the list-the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands,
the Cook Islands, Israel, Liechtenstein, the Marshall Islands, and Panama-"have enacted
most, if not all legislation needed to remedy the deficiencies identified in June 2000."' 9 The
FATF said four jurisdictions-Dominica, Niue, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and
the Grenadines-"have taken concrete steps to enact legislation and regulations" even
though "a number of deficiencies still remain." 0
The FATF gave less positive grades to Lebanon and the Philippines, which the FATF
characterizes as having started "processes to change laws and regulations" and Russia,
14. Id. at 12.
15. Id. at 13-14.
16. Joseph Kahn, 15 Countries Named as Potential Money-Laundering Havens, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2000,
at A4.
17. Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, FATF Wekomes Proposed Austrian Legislation to
Eliminate Anonymous Passbooks, June 15, 2000, available at http://www.oecd.org/fatf.
18. FATF Declines to Revise List of Global Havens for Dirty Money, DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), Feb.





844 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
which is preparing legislation for introduction to the Duma. According to the FATF, only
Nauru, a South Pacific island, has not yet communicated with the FATF on how it intends
to address its alleged deficiencies."
During its annual plenary meeting in June 2001, the FATF will consider the results of
the continuing dialogue with the non-cooperative countries, at which time it will reach a
decision on what, if any, measures should be taken against jurisdictions still considered non-
cooperation. Also at this time, the FATF will provide details on a second set of evaluations
now occurring on other jurisdictions not named on the initial non-cooperative list. The
FATF will also discuss emerging money laundering trends, as well as the proposed coun-
termeasures law enforcement agencies should consider.23
On June 22, 2000, the FATF issued its 1999-2000 annual report, which summarized its
many initiatives, especially in three main areas: (1) extending the anti-money laundering
work to all continents and regions of the world; (2) improving its members' implementation
of the Forty Recommendations; and (3) improving the review of money laundering methods
and countermeasures. 24
Among an important accomplishment during the year was the admission of Argentina,
Brazil, and Mexico as full members of the FATF, the establishment of FATF-style regional
bodies, and the improvement of the anti-money laundering systems in FATF members,
especially Austria, whose suspension the FATF threatened over its lack of compliance.
Since September 1999, the three new Latin American members, Argentina, Brazil, and
Mexico, have participated in the work of the FATF as observers. Their entry into the FATF
is part of its expansion of its membership to a limited number of strategically important
countries that could play a major role in their regions in the process of combating money
laundering. The minimum criteria for admission to FATF are:
(1) full commitment at the political level through implementation of the Forty Recommen-
dations, released in 1996 in revised form, within a reasonable time frame (three years) and
to undergo annual self-assessment exercises and two rounds of mutual evaluations;
(2) full and active membership in the relevant FATF-style regional body, or preparation to
work with the FATF or leadership in the establishment of a regional style body where none
exists;
(3) status as a strategically important country;
(4) criminalization of laundering of the proceeds of drug and other serious crimes; and
(5) laws that require financial institutions to identify their customers and to report unusual or
suspicious transactions.
To indicate the application of some of the criteria, the report summarizes the first mutual
evaluations of the three new members from the Americas.
In its 1999-2000 Survey of Money Laundering Trends and Techniques, the FATF reviewed
the problems arising from increasing offers of financial services over the Internet, both by
the growing number of existing mainstream financial institutions and a few pure Internet
banks. The number of Internet transactions increases money-laundering risks due to the
difficulty for banks offering such services to positively establish the identity of a particular
transactor or even determine the location from which the transaction is made.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), Annual Report 1999-2000 Oune 22, 2000),
available at http://www.oecd.org/fatf.
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Alternative remittance systems such as the Black Market Peso Exchange, hawala/hundi,
and the Chinese/East Asian systems also present difficulties since they are informal ways
for cultural, ethnic, and linguistic groups to move money without the usual audit trail.
The survey reviews the role of company formation agents in money laundering and the
ease with which they are able to take advantage of lax registration procedures and banking
or corporate secrecy of certain jurisdictions to create layers of structures between illegal
procedures. The FATF has proposed potential responses, such as a minimum standard in
company formation procedures and measures against entities on the company register that
do not comply with necessary procedures.
A trend is to use trade activity as both a cover for money laundering and as an actual
money laundering mechanism.
While narcotic trafficking continues to provide the single largest source of criminal pro-
ceeds throughout the world, the proceeds from various types of fraudulent activity compose
an increasing portion of illegal funds. Certain professions, such as solicitors, notaries, and
accountants in connection with company formation agents, are often participants in laun-
dering schemes, which have led a number of countries to adopt countermeasures.
To strengthen international cooperation, the FATF is preparing a guide for each FATF
jurisdiction that sets forth the key features of each country's privacy and secrecy laws, its
ability to share information and the conditions under which such information might be
exchanged, and the position of each country on mutual legal assistance. The guide would
have a list of contacts for financial regulators, law enforcement agencies, and relevant min-
istries, departments, or administrative authorities.
B. OECD
The OECD has twenty-nine members, including all of the EU Member States. In May
1996, the OECD Council of Ministers requested the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs
"to develop measures for countering harmful tax competition on investment and financing
decisions and the consequences for national tax bases.""5 The OECD Committee on Fiscal
Affairs established a task force known as the Special Sessions on Tax Competition to im-
plement the request. At a meeting convened on April 8, 1998, the Council of Ministers
adopted the report and a series of recommendations to its membersz6 Luxembourg and
Switzerland abstained and released statements, explaining their opposition to the report.27
The OECD has delayed slightly the implementation of the OECD harmful tax com-
petition (HTC) while strengthening cooperation with international organizations and
informal groups friendly to the proposal as target jurisdictions such as Jersey and The
Bahamas have issued a statement strongly critical of the initiative.
On January 8-9, 2001, the high level consultations on the OECDs HTC initiative re-
sulted in progress for all sides. The targeted countries and the Commonwealth Secretariat
25. Statements by Luxembourg and Switzerland, OECD Tax, available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/fa/
harm.tax/swislux.htm (last updated Mar. 1, 2001).
26. OECD ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION & DEVELOPMENT, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN
EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE (1998).
27. For additional background on the report and its impact on offshore jurisdictions, see Bruce Zagaris, The
Assault on Low Tax Jurisdictions: A Call for Balance and Debate, 8 TAx MGMT. INT'LJ. 473, 474-500 (1999); see
also Bruce Zagaris, Offihore Jurisdictions Tack as Gusting Winds Buffet Their Boats and Shores, 20 TAXES INT'L
823-28 (Feb. 21, 2000).
SUMMER 2001
846 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
achieved the withdrawal of the OECD Framework for Collective Memorandum of Un-
derstanding (OECD Collective MOU)2s and other promises from the OECD, such as a
more open and inclusive process. The OECD achieved an agreement to proceed with the
initiative on the basic principles that have formed the essence of the HTC initiative. The
OECD has surrendered time and a revised process in exchange for a process that will
guarantee better implementation and enforcement.
The meeting also produced many interesting papers and discussions on the making and
implementation of international tax policy, the respective roles of national governments and
international organizations in legislating, implementing, and enforcing policies.
The meeting agreed to establish a task force. The task force will consist of Australia,
Barbados, the United Kingdom, France, Ireland, Cook Islands, the British Virgin Islands,
Malaysia, Malta, Japan, and Vanuatu. The task force has two main responsibilities: (1) to
find a mutually acceptable political process to turn the three principles into commitments
that, if successful, would replace the OECD's process in the context of its Framework for
a Collective MOU; and (2) to examine how the parties could continue the existing dialogue.
It would examine how the recently created Global Forum on Taxation could evolve into a
forum, that would promote global cooperation on tax matters, thereby responding to the
Commonwealth Secretariat's call for "truly inclusive Global Forum."29 Work on the first
task would start immediately with a meeting in January in London at the Commonwealth
Secretariat in order to use the momentum for the Tokyo meeting on February 15-16,
2001.30
C. UNITED NATIONS
During the week of December 12-15, 2000, 124 countries signed the United Nations
Convention on Transnational Organized Crime3' during a four-day high-level signing con-
ference in Palermo, Italy. An additional eighty countries are close to signing. 2 At a cere-
mony on December 12, 2000, the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime
(TOCC) issued and opened two protocols for signature, one to prevent, suppress, and
punish trafficking in persons, especially women and children, and the other against the
smuggling of migrants by land, sea, and air.
The Convention seeks to strengthen the power of governments in combating serious
crimes. The new Convention will provide the basis for stronger common action against
money laundering, greater ease of extradition, and measures on the protection of witnesses
and enhanced judicial cooperation. It will also create a funding mechanism to assist coun-
28. For background on the OECD Collective MOU, see Bruce Zagaris, OECD Releases MOU on Harmful
Tax Practices, 17 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 13-15 (Jan. 2001).
29. Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, OECD, Commonwealth Agree to Work Towards Global
Co-operation on Harmful Tax Practices, Jan. 10, 2001, available at http://www.oecd.org/media/release/nw01-
03a.htm.
30. For additional discussion, see Bruce Zagaris, Consultations in Barbados on OECD Harmful Tax Competition
Initiative Yield Progress, 17 INT'L ENFORCEMErr L. REP. 50-54 (Feb. 2001).
31. See Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, supra note 1.
32. More Than 120 Nations Sign New U.N. Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, asHigh-LevelMeeting
Concludes in Palermo, United Nations, Dec. 15, 2000, available at http://www.odccp.org/palermo/press.html;
for additional background, see also Alessandra Stanley, Palermo Shows Off as a Cleaned-Up Mafia Capital, N.Y.
TMES, Dec. 13, 2000, at A3.
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tries in implementing the Convention. The Convention aims to help countries synchronize
their national laws so that no uncertainty will exist as to whether a crime in one country is
also a crime in another."
Signatory countries undertake the following commitments in the TOCC: (1) to crimi-
nalize offenses committed by organized crime groups, including corruption and corporate
or company offenses; (2) to combat money laundering and the proceeds of crime; (3) to
accelerate and extend the scope of extradition; (4) to protect witnesses testifying against
criminal groups; (5) to strengthen cooperation to locate and prosecute suspects; (6) to en-
hance prevention of organized crime at the national and international levels; and (7) to
develop a series of protocols containing measures to combat specific acts of transnational
organized crime. 4
m. Substantive and Institutional Issues
A. ESTABLISHMENT AND EVOLUTION OF FIUs
A structural development of the international money movement enforcement subregime
has been the establishment of a new law enforcement agency or group in each country that
has primary responsibility for implementing anti-money laundering legislation and receiv-
ing and sending requests internationally. The FATF has recommended the establishment
of such agencies, also known as FIUs. Although they have various names and acronyms
(e.g., Financial Crimes Center or FinCEN in the United States, the National Crimes In-
telligence Center or NCIC in England, and Austrac in Australia), they have similar re-
sponsibilities and structures, and are increasingly networking with one another.
B. GATEKEEPERS INITIATIVE AND OTHER DUE DILIGENCE
An international initiative has been to develop measures to facilitate better cooperation
in counter-money laundering by gatekeepers. Professionals, such as lawyers and accoun-
tants, who advise on and help with transactions involving the movement of money, are
deemed to have a special role in identifying, preventing, and reporting money laundering.
Some countries, such as the United Kingdom and Cayman, already impose due diligence
requirements on gatekeepers similar to financial institutions (e.g., know your client," "iden-
tify and report suspicious transactions,"3 6 and the exercise of care to not tip off persons
engaging in suspicious transactions).
C. TAx CRIMES AND MONEY LAUNDERING
A trend has been for law enforcement and regulatory authorities to combine international
tax and counter-money laundering enforcement by: (1) ensuring that obligations to report
33. Id.
34. United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, After Palermo:An Overview of What the
Convention and Protocols Hope to Accomplish, available at http://www.odccp.org/palermo/suml.html (last visited
Mar. 8, 2001).
35. Finance-Glossary.com, The Online Dictionary of Financial and Investment Terms, at http://
www.finance-glossary.com/terms/1082 1.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2001).
36. Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), Annual Report 1997-1998, Monitoring the
Implementation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures, available at http://russia.shaps.hawaii.edu/crime/apan-
laundering.html (last modified June 23, 2000).
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transactions relating to suspected criminal offenses apply even where such transactions are
believed to involve tax offenses; and (2) permitting money laundering authorities to forward
information to their tax authorities to support the investigation of tax-related crimes, and
communicating such information to other jurisdictions so that it can be used by their tax
authorities."
IV. U.S. Developments
A. FINCEN ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGIC PLAN
On September 30, 2000, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network of the U.S. De-
partment of Treasury issued its Strategic Plan 2000-2005, which calls for enhanced efforts
to combat international money laundering."'
FinCEN cooperates closely with other agencies and parts of the U.S. government and
other governments to combat transnational crime and its impact on financial institutions
and governments. FinCEN provides this help by supporting its FIU counterparts and fa-
cilitating the exchange of information among these institutions in support of anti-money
laundering investigations. In addition, FinCEN, in coordination with other U.S. govern-
ment agencies, helps foreign governments and institutions to combat transnational crime
by assessing and evaluating money laundering controls in specific countries and by provid-
ing training and technical assistance.
FinCEN will help the U.S. Department of Treasury initiatives mentioned in the National
Money Laundering Strategy for 2000,19 which include: providing training and assistance to
countries implementing counter-money laundering measures; supporting expanded Flu
membership in the Egmont Group; and providing country-specific expertise for policy
development. FinCEN will increase its efforts to increase the international jurisdictions
that represent a money laundering threat to the United States, and expand its expertise and
analysis related to correspondent banking and offshore financial services.
During 1999, FinCEN has experienced three times the increase in the international
cooperation it has provided to support U.S. law enforcement. It also helps foreign law
enforcement agencies in their investigations.4
FinCEN has also listed its strategies for the five-year period. Among the international
aspects, it will promote increased cooperation with and among foreign law enforcement
authorities to exchange information about investigations and significant money laundering
systems. With this connection, it will promote the networking FlUs through the Egmont
Secure Web to increase the timely sharing of investigative information. By using its exten-
sive knowledge base, FinCEN also plans to provide evaluations of countries' efforts to
combat money laundering. FinCEN will provide training and technical assistance to co-
operating countries in the development and operation of FIlUs and the formulation and
implementation of counter-money laundering strategies. FinCEN will support the Trea-
37. See, e.g., Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), The FATF 1998-99 Survey of
Trends and Techniques, available at http://www.oecd.org/fatf.
38. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Strategic Plan 2000-2005,
available at http://www.treas.gov/fincen/finstrategicplan2000.pdflast updated Feb. 22, 2001).
39. U.S. Department of the Treasury, National Money Laundering Strategy for 2000, Mar. 2000 [hereinafter
Money Laundering Strategy].
40. Id. at 17.
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sury's efforts to highlight the importance of global counter-money laundering efforts bi-
laterally, multilaterally, and within intergovernmental bodies and multilateral organizations,
and to promote the adoption of international anti-money laundering standards, such as the
Forty Recommendations of the FATE
FinCEN plans to measure progress in its strategies by reviewing key international work-
load measures that indicate the response to FinCEN's efforts to support FIU development,
and promote policies and the exchange of investigative information internationally to com-
bat money laundering in the United States and abroad.41
B. PROPOSED ANTi-MONEY LAUNDERING LEGISLATION
In the last session of Congress, many international money laundering bills were intro-
duced. They focused, inter alia, on extending the predicate offenses to U.S. money laun-
dering to include foreign crimes, specifically corruption of public officials, and requiring
the executive branch to impose reporting and/or restrictions against transactions from for-
eign jurisdictions that lack sufficient anti-money laundering laws and regulations.
C. FOREIGN NARcOTICS KINGPIN DESIGNATION ACT
1. The Law
On December 3, 1999, President Bill Clinton signed the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin
Designation Act (FNKDA),4 legislation that prohibits U.S. companies from doing business
with foreign firms that have links to drug "kingpins" throughout the world.43 The new law
provides a budget for intelligence operations to monitor activities of narcotics traffickers
and their related organizations. In a written statement accompanying the bill's signing,
President Clinton pledged to work with other countries in implementing the law in a way
to combat the national security threat posed to the United States by international drug
trafficking.
The provisions of the act are contained in Title VIII (International Narcotics Trafficking)
sections 801-11. Section 802 makes findings, namely that Presidential Decision Directive
42,- issued on October 21, 1995 ordering U.S. agencies to increase the priority and re-
sources devoted to the threat international crime presents to national security, work more
closely with other governments to develop a global response to the threat, and use aggres-
sively and creatively all legal means available to combat international crime. Executive Or-
der Number 1297841 provides for the use of the authorities in the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)- to target and apply sanctions to four international nar-
cotics traffickers and their organizations that operate from Colombia (e.g., the Cali cartel).
Section 802(a)(3) finds that IEEPA was applied successfully to international narcotics traf-
41. Id. at 18.
42. Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1908,8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1994).
43. The White House Office of Communications, Statement by President on Intelligence Authorization
Act, Dec. 3, 1999, available at 1999 WL 1102909; for background on the signing, see also Corbett B. Daly,
Clinton Signs Sanctions Measure Barring Business witb Firms Tied to Drug Kingpins, DAILY REP. FOR ExEc. (BNA),
Dec. 8, 1999, at A21.
44. Presidential Decision Directive 42, issued on Oct. 21, 1995.
45. Exec. Order No. 12978, 60 Fed. Reg. 54,579 (Oct. 21, 1995).
46. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-07, (2000).
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fickers in Colombia and based on that successful case study Congress believes similar au-
thorities should be applied globally. Section 802(a)(4) finds the existence of a "national
emergency resulting from the activities of international narcotics traffickers and their or-
ganizations that threatens the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United
States." 47 U.S. policy will be to apply economic and other financial sanctions to significant
foreign narcotics traffickers and their organizations worldwide to protect the national se-
curity, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.4s
The goal of the new law is to provide authority to identify and apply sanctions globally
to significant foreign narcotics traffickers, their organizations, and the foreign persons who
provide support to those significant foreign narcotics traffickers and their organizations,
whose activities threaten the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United
States.49
Under the law, the president must transmit to the various congressional committees 0 a
list in June of each year (starting June 1, 2000) that would name suspected drug traffickers
and their U.S. connections. The director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and
Cabinet members from the departments of Defense, Justice, State, and Treasury would
make recommendations to the president on the individuals and organizations to include on
the list. An unclassified version of the report will be available to the public.5 The reports
must not disclose the identity of any person, if the director of the CIA determines such
disclosure could compromise an intelligence operation, activity, source, or method of the
United States or if the attorney general determines that such disclosure could reasonably
be expected to compromise the identity of a confidential source or jeopardize the integrity
or success of an ongoing criminal investigation or prosecution.52
The Act immediately blocks all assets and property of the foreign drug kingpins and
associates (e.g., persons materially assisting in, providing financial or technological support
for or to, or providing goods or services in support of, the international narcotics trafficking
activities of a significant foreign narcotics trafficker; foreign persons the Treasury designates
as owned, controlled, or directed by, or acting for or on behalf of, a significant foreign
narcotics trafficker the president designates; and any foreign person the Treasury designates
as playing a significant role in international narcotics trafficking).53 The law also prohibits
U.S. persons from engaging in any transaction or dealing in property or interests in prop-
erty of any significant foreign narcotics trafficker and any transaction or dealing by a U.S.
person or within the United States that evades or avoids, or has the effect of evading or
avoiding, and any attempt or conspiracy to violate any of the prohibitions of the Act. 4
The secretary of the Treasury is empowered to issue regulations, instructions, licenses,
or otherwise investigate, regulate, or prohibit any transactions in foreign exchange, cur-
47. Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act, § 802(a)(4).
48. Id. § 802.
49. Id. § 803.
50. The Congressional Committees are the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Com-
mittees on the Judiciary, International Relations, Armed Services, and Ways and Means of the House of
Representatives; and the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committees on the Judiciary, Foreign
Relations, Armed Services, and the Finance of the Senate.
51. Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act, § 804.
52. See id. § 804(e).
53. Id. § 805(b).
54. Id. § 805(c).
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rency, or securities as well as transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to
any banking institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments involve any interests
of any foreign country or a national thereof. The Treasury can also investigate, block, and
take a range of actions over transactions or any property in which any foreign country or
national thereof has any interest, by any person or with respect to any property, subject to
U.S. jurisdiction." The Treasury may require record keeping, reporting, and production
of documents to carry out the purposes of the Act.16
The Act states that no person can "be held liable in any court for or with respect to
anything done or omitted in good faith in connection with the administration of, or pur-
suant to, and in reliance on this title, or any instruction, or direction" under the title."
While this provision seems novel in the context of the IEEPA, very few U.S. persons can
withstand the disabilities that attend an administrative or court enforcement action under
IEEPA. The Act gives broad rulemaking authority to the Treasury."
Penalties under the law include fines of up to $10 million for entities and ten years
imprisonment for willful neglect or refusal to comply with orders. 59 An officer, director, or
agent of any entity who knowingly participates in a violation is subject to imprisonment of
not more than thirty years and a fine of not more than $5 million.60 A person who violates
any license, order, rule, or regulation is subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $1 million.61
A person can seek judicial review of a civil penalty only to the extent allowed in 5 U.S.C.
§ 702.62
The law requires the Immigration and Nationality Service (INS) to exclude entry into
the United States by any alien who the INS knows or has reason to believe is or has been
an illicit trafficker of any controlled substance or in any listed chemical, or is or has been
a knowing aider, abettor, assister, conspirator, or colluder with others in such activity; or
the spouse, son, or daughter of an alien who is inadmissible due to the aforementioned
international narcotics activity if such spouse, son, or daughter has within the previous five
years obtained any financial or other benefit from the illicit activity of the alien, and knew
or reasonably should have known that the financial or other benefit was the product of such
illicit activity.63
The Act establishes a Judicial Review Commission on Foreign Asset Control. Its five
members will be appointed by the congressional intelligence committees and must have an
appropriate security clearance. The duties of the Commission are to conduct both a review
of the current judicial, regulatory, and administrative authorities relating to the blocking
of assets of foreign persons by the United States and a detailed examination and evaluation
of the remedies available to U.S. persons affected by the blocking of assets of foreign persons
by the United States. The Commission is authorized to hold hearings, take testimony,
and receive evidence. Additionally, the Commission may secure directly from any executive
agency information, suggestions, and statistics. The Commission must handle and protect
55. Id. § 806(a).
56. Id. § 806(b).
57. Id. § 806(c).
58. Id. § 806(d).
59. Id. § 807(a)(1).
60. Id. § 807(a)(2).
61. Id. § 807(b).
62. Id. § 807(c).
63. Id. § 809.
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all classified information provided to it in accordance with applicable statutes and regula-
tions.64 The law was signed and took effect on December 3, 1999.65
When President Clinton signed the bill into law, he stated that the United States looks
forward to "working with appropriate host government authorities to pursue additional
measures against those designated.66 At present, the weakness of the Act is its unilateral
extraterritorial nature. President Clinton stated his concern about several parts of the Act
as well as segments of the accompanying joint explanatory statement. Early on, the Zedillo
administration has opposed economic sanctions for drug kingpins. 67 Another controversial
aspect of the new Act is its apparent designation of foreign entities as connected with, owned
by, or associated with foreign drug kingpins and the associated blocking, immigration ex-
clusion, and other disabilities, without an opportunity for the entities to participate in any
way in the designation process. The Act indicates the continued and even extended reliance
by the United States on unilateral economic sanctions in areas of enforcement, such as
counter-drug policy.
2. The First List of Kingpins
On June 1, 2000, President Clinton identified twelve foreign persons as significant for-
eign narcotics traffickers pursuant to the FNKDA. s The list contained no surprises. Each
of the persons named are already under indictment and have been cited for many years as
drug lords.69
The persons named on the list include some of the major Mexican drug kingpins: Jos6
and Luis Amezcua-Contreras, brothers and amphetamine traffickers who also are impris-
oned; Ramon Arellano-Felix, also known as El Comadante, a member of the FBI's Top 10
list and a leader of Mexico's violent Tijuana Cartel and his brother Benjamin Arellano-
Felix; Rafael Caro-Quintero, who operated out of the Sonora area and is imprisoned for
the murder of Drug Enforcement Administration agent Enrique Camarena in 1985; and
Vicente Carrillo Fuentes, head of the Juarez Cartel. Also on the list are Chi Fu Chang, a
Burmese national and warlord also known as Khun Sa; Chinese national Wei Hsueh-Kang;
two persons who have resided and caused controversy in St. Kitts, Noel Timothy Heath
and Glenroy Vingrove Matthews; and two Nigerians, Abeni 0. and Oluwole A. Ogungbuyi,
husband and wife.
On the OFAC list, the names of the twelve persons have been put into the various versions
of OFAC's listing of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons with the identifier
SDNTK to distinguish them from the SDNT designation.1°
64. Id. § 8 10.
65. Id. § 811.
66. President William Clinton, Statement on Intelligence Authorization Act, Dec. 3, 1999, at http://
ofcn.org/cyber.serv/teledem/pb/1999/dec/msgOO03l.html.
67. For a discussion of the opposition of the Zedillo Administration, see Mexico Rejects U.S. Requests as U.S.
Considers Imposition of Economic Sanctions against Mexican Druglords, 13 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 227, 228
(June 1997), http://www.ielr.com/jun97.htm.
68. For the list and a discussion of it, see Letter from the President to Select Committee Chairmen (June
2, 2000), at http://ofcn.org/cyber.serv/teledem/pb/2000/jun/msgOOOl2.html.
69. Associated Press, Wite House Issues a Blacklist ofTop Suspected Drug Traffickers, N.Y. TIMES,June 2, 2000,
at A8.
70. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Implementation of the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin
Designation Act (June 2, 2000), at http://www.usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/mexico/kingpin.htm.
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Soon hundreds of businesses and individuals associated with the named kingpins will be
designed as Tier 2 entities under the Act, which will also bar them from doing business
with U.S. firms. The Tier 2 names will be even more important because many of them may
be engaging in legitimate and thriving business. Numerous companies designated as Tier
2 entities in Colombia have gone out of business."'
The White House must submit the list to certain congressional committees by June 1
each year, and to follow it by July 1 with a confidential outline of sanctions the White
House intends to impose on individuals or businesses allegedly associated with drug lords. 2
The president need not obtain congressional permission before imposing sanctions." The
persons named or affected can appeal to the Treasury Department or use the counts to
challenge the sanctions against them.14
3. The Regulations
OnJuly 5, 2000, the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Department of Treasury
issued the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Sanctions Regulations. The Regulations were issued
pursuant to the FNKDA.70
The Act authorizes sanctions against significant foreign narcotics traffickers and their
organizations. Section 805(b) of the Act blocks all property and interests in property within
the United States or within the possession or control of any U.S. person that are owned or
controlled by significant foreign narcotics traffickers, as identified by the president, or for-
eign persons designated by the secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the attorney
general, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, the administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the secretary
of Defense, and the secretary of state.76 Persons are designated if they are found to be:
(1) materially helping in or providing financial or technological support for or to, or providing
goods or services in support of, the international narcotics trafficking activities of a sig-
nificant foreign narcotics trafficker or foreign persons designated by the secretary of the
Treasury pursuant to Section 805(b) of the act;
(2) owned, controlled, or directed by, or acting for or on behalf of, a significant foreign nar-
cotics trafficker or foreign persons designated by the secretary of the Treasury pursuant to
Section 805(b) of the act; or
(3) playing a significant role in international narcotics trafficking."
Persons coming within any of the above three categories are referred to as specially des-
ignated narcotics traffickers.
The regulations are found in Section 31 of the Code of Federal Regulations, part 598.
The regulations are separate from, and independent of, the Narcotics Trafficking Sanc-
tions,"8 which implement the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12978 of
71. See Vernon Loeb, U.S. Lists 12 Foreigners as Drug Kingpins, Wash. Post, June 3, 2000, at AS.




75. Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1908, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1994).
76. See 21 U.S.C. § 1904.
77. Id.
78. Narcotics Trafficking Sanctions, 31 C.F.R. § 536 (2000).
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October 21, 1995, with respect to significant foreign narcotics traffickers based in Colom-
bia.7 9 The Colombia foreign narcotics regulations are not affected by the new regulations.
Subpart B of the regulations, which implements Section 805(a) of the Act, provides that
specially designated narcotics traffickers are subject to any and all sanctions authorized by
the Act until revoked or waived80
Section 598.202 implements Section 805(b) of the Act by providing that property and
interests in property owned or controlled by specially designated narcotics traffickers and
within the United States or within the possession of control of a U.S. person are blocked.8'
Section 598.203 of the regulations implements Section 805(c)(1) of the Act by prohibiting
transactions and dealings by U.S. persons or within the United States in property or inter-
ests in property of specially designated narcotics traffickers.s2
Section 598.204 implements Section 805(c)(2) of the Act by prohibiting transactions that
have the effect of evading or avoiding, and attempts or conspiracies to violate, the prohi-
bitions contained in this part.83
Sections 598.205 and 598.206 of the regulations set forth the effect of transfers of blocked
property in violation of the regulations and the required holding of blocked property in
interest-bearing accounts.
8 4
Pursuant to Section 808 of the Act, subpart C of the regulations defines key terms used
in the regulations. Subpart D of the regulations provides interpretive sections concerning
the general prohibitions of subpart B. For instance, Section 598.407 clarifies that the pro-
hibitions in Section 598.203 containing prohibitions of dealing with blocked accounts apply
to offshore transactions, that is, transactions with any U.S. person in a location outside the
United States with respect to property in which the U.S. person knows, or has reason to
know, that a specially designated narcotics trafficker has or has had an interest since the
effective date. The "has reason to know" standard is a difficult one for U.S. persons, es-
pecially since they can suffer criminal and administrative penal sanctions if they do not meet
the standards. Section 598.408 of the regulations provide for continuation of the sanctions
when there occurs an alleged change in ownership or control of an entity designated as a
specially designated narcotics trafficker.
8 5
Section 598.406 prohibits the provision of services performed by U.S. persons, wherever
located, on behalf of or for the benefit of a specially designated narcotics trafficker, or with
respect to property interests of a specially designated narcotics trafficker.8 6 For instance,
without a license, a U.S. person may not, except as authorized by or pursuant to this part,
provide legal, accounting, financial, brokering, freight forwarding, transportation, public
relations, or other services to a specially designated narcotics trafficker. Section 598.507
authorizes the provision of certain legal services, provided that all receipt of payment for
such services is specifically licensed s7 If transactions are prohibited but are found to be
consistent with U.S. policy, subpart E may authorize them by a general license or by a
79. See Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 598.101 (2001).
80. See id. § 598.201.
81. See id. § 598.202.
82. See id. § 598.203.
83. See id. § 598.204.
84. See id. §§ 598.205-.206.
85. See id. § 598.408.
86. See id. § 598.406.
87. See id. § 598.507.
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specific license issued pursuant to the procedures contained in subpart D of part 401 of
chapter V. The general licenses contained in subpart E include an authorization for U.S.
financial institutions to debit blocked accounts for normal service charges. 8
In Section 598.507, the provision of certain legal services is authorized, provided that
the service providers obtain a specific license for the receipt of payment for such services. 89
Subpart F of the regulations implements Sections 806(a)-(b) of the Act by referring to
the Reporting and Procedures Regulations in subpart C of 31 C.ER. part 501.
In subpart G, Section 807 of the Act is implemented. Civil and criminal penalties appli-
cable to violations of the regulations are detailed. Section 598.701 provides the civil and
criminal penalties prescribed in Sections 807(a)-(b) of the Act. Section 598.706 implements
Section 80(c) of the Act by providing that civil penalties are subject to judicial review only
to the extent provided in 5 U.S.C. § 702.
Subpart H contains certain administrative procedures applicable to this part and imple-
ments others by reference to the Reporting and Procedures Regulations in subpart D of
31 C.ER. part 501, which have provisions on administrative procedures. Section 598.802
implements Section 805(e)(3) of the Act by clarifying that records or information obtained
or created in the implementation of the regulations are not subject to disclosure under
Section 552(a)(3) of the Freedom of Information Act.90 The exemptions of records or in-
formation obtained or created in implementing the regulations are of critical importance
because a basic criticism of the regulations is the lack of procedural due process for persons
defined as specially designated narcotics traffickers, and the harsh criminal and/or admin-
istrative penal sanctions that persons can suffer if they violate the law and regulations. The
exemption of all records or information obtained or created in the implementation further
exacerbates the fairness problem. This Achilles heel of the Act and regulations will likely
encounter legal and constitutional challenges. The lack of procedural due process is com-
plicated by the proviso that "(d)iffering foreign policy and national security contexts may
result in differing interpretations of similar language among the parts of this chapter."9' In
other words, to the extent an aggrieved person or other interested person tries to invoke
the rule of law, the administrators can base differing and discriminatory treatment on di-
vergent foreign policy and national security contexts.
Section 598.803 delegates to the Office of Foreign Assets Control those actions that the
secretary of the Treasury is authorized to take pursuant to the Act. Pursuant to Section
805(e)(3) of the Act, Section 501.805(a) is amended to clarify the inapplicability of Section
552(a)(3) of the FOIA.
In implementing the regulations, OFAC will seek to consult with foreign governments
where appropriate. Indeed, from the start, President Clinton's concept behind imposing
sanctions against designated narcotics traffickers and their associates was to stimulate a
multilateral sanction program. However, as of now, even with the passage of five years since
the announcement of the sanction program, no governments have joined the U.S. narcotics
sanctions.
The extension of Part 536 Narcotics Trafficking Sanctions Regulations to Foreign Narcotics
Kingpin Sanctions Regulations shows the mission creep of the application of economic
88. See id. § 598.506.
89. See id. § 598.507.
90. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (2000).
91. See Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Sanctions Regulations § 598.101.
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sanctions to diverse issues, for example, first Colombian organized crime traffickers, and
now foreign narcotics kingpins and their families and associates.
4. Judicial Review Commission Report
On December 4, 2000, the Judicial Review Commission on Foreign Asset Control issued
a report to Congress pursuant to the FNKDA92 recommending greater openness and re-
sponsiveness by the Office of Foreign Asset Control and greater formal administrative
review of final OFAC actions. The Commission found that the provision of the Act re-
stricting judicial review of designations by the secretary of the Treasury, while not uncon-
stitutional, is both unnecessary and inconsistent with the accountability of government
actions inherent in sanctions programs established pursuant to the IEEPA93 and in numer-
ous other regulatory schemes.
D. REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS
1. FinCEN Advisories Against Non-Cooperative Countries
Within a couple of days of the FATF report on non-cooperative countries, FinCEN
issued advisories against each of the fifteen non-cooperative jurisdictions. In Category 1
involving the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands, Israel, and the Philippines, financial institutions
dealing with transactions originating in or routed to or through these jurisdictions or trans-
actions involving entities organized or domiciled, or persons maintaining accounts, in the
identified jurisdiction, are requested to consider carefully how the deficiencies in the
particular jurisdiction's counter-money laundering controls could effect the possibility that
the transactions are being used for illegal purposes. Financial institutions are asked to pro-
vide enhanced scrutiny to transactions or banking relationships that do not involve estab-
lished and adequately identified and understood, commercial companies or investment
companies, for example, IBCs, as opposed to well-known operating businesses and invest-
ment companies.
Category 2 applies to Panama and Russia. In addition to the provisos in Category 1, the
advisories also ask financial institutions to pay special attention to specific types of trans-
actions that have been identified as being associated with money laundering in these juris-
dictions. For Panama, the advisory advises scrutiny for large transactions involving cash,
third-party checks and wire transfers, and to transactions originating in or routed to or
through, and entities organized or domiciled in, the Colon Free Trade Zone. Careful scru-
tiny should be given to large transactions involving cash and wire transfers with Russia.
Category 3 applies to the Cook Islands, Dominica, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, the Marshall
Islands, Nauru, Niue, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Financial
institutions in the United States are asked to give increased attention to any transaction
originating in or routed to or through the identified jurisdictions or involving entities or-
ganized or domiciled, or persons maintaining accounts, in the identified jurisdiction. In
contrast to the first two categories of advisories, financial institutions are not requested to
consider the particular jurisdiction's specific anti-money laundering deficiencies or to focus
on operating businesses and investment companies that are not well known.
92. See Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 1901-08.
93. See International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-07.
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In all of the advisories, FinCEN directs financial institutions subject to suspicious activity
reporting requirements to examine carefully transactions of $5,000 or more of the types
covered by the advisory to determine if the filing of a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) is
required.94
2. SAR Report
In October 2000, the Bank Secrecy Act Advisory Group, a joint government-private
sector group, published for the first time the Suspicious Activities Report (SAR) Review: Trends
Tips & Issues.95 Significantly, the report reflects a number of important trends with respect
to international money laundering enforcement in the United States.
The report is the result of a continuing collaboration among U.S. financial institutions,
federal law enforcement, and regulatory agencies to provide meaningful information about
the preparation, use, and utility of SARs filed by financial institutions. The publication
reflects the recognition of both the relevant government agencies and the country's financial
institutions of the desirability of a continuing public exchange of information about the
SAR system and its results.
The Bank Secrecy Act Advisory Group will publish the SAR Activity Review semiannually
in October and April, beginning in October 2000. In addition, analytic reports, issue papers,
and other publications related to or resulting from information contained in the Review
may be published separately.
a. National Trends and Analyses
One section of the SAR Activity Review indicates examples and patterns of suspicious
activity reported in the national database.
(i) Shell Company Activity. During the first half of 2000, the SARs filed revealed sev-
eral instances of activity involving suspicious wire transfer patterns. Many of these suspi-
cious wire transfer patterns involve shell companies, that is, corporations that engage in no
apparent business activity and that only serve as a conduit for funds or securities. The
activities often also involve foreign transactions located in jurisdictions considered non-
compliant or problematic, as reported in FinCEN advisories.
Several types of suspicious wire transfer transactions have been identified, each involving
geographically complicated wire transfer routing (originator, beneficiary, or transit/inter-
mediary bans) and/or geographically complex originator and beneficiary activity. More than
$500 million in suspicious wire transfers have been reported in relation to this type of
activity.
Common patterns of underlying suspicious activity have been observed as follows: a lack
of evidence of legitimate business activity, or any business operations at all, undertaken by
many of the companies; unusually large numbers of wire transfers (several thousand wires
totaling more than $500 million); transactions conducted in bursts of activities within a
short period of time; beneficiaries maintaining accounts at foreign banks that have been the
subject of previous SAR reporting due to suspicious wire transfer activity; and reappearing
94. For background on the U.S. Treasury Advisories, see Amy Rudnick & Linda Noonan, Treasury Issues
Fifteen Advisories Directed at Non-Cooperative Jurisdictions, American Bankers Association/American Bar Asso-
ciation, TWELFTH ANNUAL MONEY LAUNDERING ENFORCEMENT SEMINAR 145-47 (Oct. 29-30, 2000).
95. See Bank Secrecy Act Advisory Group, The SAR Activity Review: Trends Tips & Issues (Oct. 2000), available
at http://www.treas.gov/fincen/sarreviewforweb.pdf.
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beneficiary banks located in offshore jurisdictions, the account of at least one of which has
been closed by the reporting financial institution due to overall suspect activity.
(ii) Possible Reflections of Russian Criminal Activity. Law enforcement information
shows a steady increase in Russian organized criminal activity in the United States since
the early 1990s. Senior law enforcement officials requested assistance in comprehending
the scope of financial activity that may be connected to Russian organized crime groups in
the United States. An analysis of Bank Secrecy Act (BSA)96 data shows that SARs filed by
U.S. financial institutions for suspected structuring/money laundering activity involving
Russian transactors, owners, or citizenship averages approximately $200 million annually.
(iii) Increased SAR Reporting Involving Mexico. SARs show a shift in suspected money
laundering activity involving Mexico. Instead of transiting through Mexico en route to
Colombia or other Central and South American destinations, a shift has occurred toward
using techniques and schemes in which drug proceeds are cycled through Mexico directly
back into the United States. SARs show patterns of large wire transactions ($1.5 million or
more per transaction) moving funds to U.S. payees from Mexican money exchange houses
and other financial institutions, which may in part, be attributable to changes in the laun-
dering cycle. In general, such changes in patterns are believed to come from the heightened
profile of Mexico-based criminal groups in drug trafficking in the United States, which
create a corresponding increase in the threat of money laundering activity linked to Mexico.
(iv) Non-Compliant Countries. In July 2000, FinCEN issued fifteen advisories with
respect to deficiencies in the anti-money laundering controls of the following countries:
The Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Dominica, Israel, Lebanon, Liechtenstein,
Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Panama, Philippines, Russian Federation, St. Kitts and
Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Financial institutions were instructed to con-
sider such deficiencies in determining whether transactions involving each of the fifteen
countries required the filing of a SAR.
FinCEN is now analyzing SAR filings for each of the designated countries to determine
if the overall volume of SARs and the nature of the suspicious activities have changed as a
result of the advisory process. Feedback on the results of the post-advisory analysis will be
furnished at a subsequent date once sufficient data has been accumulated to permit a
meaningful comparison with the pre-advisory baseline information for each of the affected
countries.
b. Law Enforcement Cases
The SAR Activity Review has a section providing law enforcement agencies the oppor-
tunity to summarize investigative activity in which SARs and other BSA information played
an important role in a successful investigation and/or prosecution of criminal financial
activity.
In Florida, a SAR filing resulted in the identification of additional fraud committed by a
subject already under investigation by special agents within the U.S. Secret Service's (USSS)
Tampa Field Office. From December 1996 through May 1997, investigators identified an
individual who deposited counterfeit commercial checks into various bank accounts opened
under aliases, and then immediately wired the funds from the accounts opened under aliases
to accounts in Nigeria. Because these checks were drawn against true bank accounts, several
96. Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1051, 31 C.F.R. 103 (1970).
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days would elapse before the counterfeit checks were detected. Sometimes, the counterfeit
checks actually cleared the bank that the checks were drawn upon. In total, the subject had
deposited and collected on $400,000 in counterfeit commercial checks.
In June 1997, a financial institution filed a SAR form stating that the subject (using an
alias) had opened an account at the bank using a small account of money. A few days later,
$85,000 in commercial checks was deposited into the account. A short time later, the subject
tried to wire a large portion of the $85,000 to Nigeria through a bank in New York City.
Personnel within the original bank inquired about the sporadic account activity and the
wire transfer. As a result, they did not wire the funds and identified the commercial checks
as counterfeit. This information was included on the SAR form filed by the financial insti-
tution. The USSS investigators then learned that the subject used the name identified by
the bank as an alias. Due to this SAR filing, investigators were able to make the required
link and attributed additional fraud losses to the defendant. The defendant was arrested,
convicted, and sentenced to forty-eight months in prison.
The U.S. Customs Service in Chicago investigated a Russian and Lithuanian organized
crime group that was heavily involved in the smuggling of stolen luxury vehicles out of the
United States into Europe. Independent analysis of a SAR filing indicated suspicious be-
havior relating to the Russian organized crime network that was under investigation. The
SAR filing was subsequently disclosed to the Customs case agent who used the filing to
identify additional associates and bank accounts. The information contained in the SAR
filing contributed to the successful prosecution of the suspects and the seizure and forfeiture
of assets.
A U.S. Customs Service investigation in Houston of a criminal organization engaged in
the repackaging and exportation of stolen commercial baby formula was helped by an anal-
ysis of SAR filings and CTRs. The criminal network, which operated in several states,
laundered their illicit profits through financial institutions to the Middle East. An analysis
of CTRs monitored the movement of these funds. Thereafter, SAR filings were discovered
that underscored the suspected transactions. An analysis of the SAR filings and CTRs,
together with a combination of various investigative techniques, resulted in multiple in-
dictments on various federal offenses, including money laundering, and the identification
and seizure of several bank accounts.
E. PUBLIC FIGURES
On January 16, 2001, the U.S. Department of Treasury, the Federal Reserve Board, the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the Department of State announced the issuance of
new guidance to help U.S. financial institutions avoid transactions that may involve the
proceeds of foreign official corruption.97 The guidance, which was issued to support Action
Item 2.1.1 of the U.S. National Money Laundering Strategy for 2000,98 encourages U.S. fi-
nancial institutions to apply enhanced scrutiny to their private banking and similar high
97. See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Guidance on Enhanced Scrutiny for Transactions that May
Involve the Proceeds of Foreign Official Corruption, Jan. 16, 2001, available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/
releases/guidance.htm; see also U.S. Department of the Treasury, New Money Laundering Guidance Isnsed, Public
Affairs, LS-1123,Jan. 16, 2001, available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/ps1123.htm.
98. See Money Laundering Strategy, supra note 39.
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dollar accounts and transactions where such accounts or transactions may involve the pro-
ceeds of corruption by senior foreign political figures, their immediate family or close
associates. The guidance provides a set of suggested account establishment and maintenance
procedures designed to help institutions obtain appropriate information on accounts held
by such persons, as well as a list of potentially suspicious transactions that will often warrant
enhanced scrutiny.
Financial institutions are encouraged to develop and maintain enhanced scrutiny prac-
tices and procedures designed to detect and deter transactions that may involve the proceeds
of official corruption by senior foreign political figures, their immediate family, or their
close associates. These practices and procedures are part of institutions' due diligence anti-
money laundering policies and procedures and should ensure that institutions report such
activity as suspicious in accordance with applicable suspicious activity reporting require-
ments. Financial institutions should review their practices in this area as part of their overall
internal and external audit.
A financial institution can elect to apply the advice in the guidance depending on the
extent of the risk determined to exist by each institution as a general matter, given its normal
business operations, and in each case as it is presented. Each financial institution must
exercise reasonable judgment in designing and implementing policies and procedures con-
cerning senior foreign political figures, their immediate family and their close associates,
and for determining any necessary actions to be undertaken by the institution regarding
their transactions.
In undertaking the reasonable steps and reasonable efforts suggested in the guidance, a
financial institution should not rely solely on information obtained from the covered person
or his or her associates. Instead, it should try to obtain additional information from its
organization and from independent sources.
A "covered person" is defined as a person identified in the course of normal account
opening, maintenance, or compliance procedures to be a "senior foreign political figure,"
any member of a senior foreign political figure's "immediate family," and any "close asso-
ciate" of a senior foreign political figure.
A "senior foreign political figure" is a senior official in the executive, legislative, administrative,
military, or judicial branches of a foreign government (whether elected or not), a senior official
of a major foreign political party, or a senior executive of a foreign government-owned cor-
poration. In addition, a "senior foreign political figure" includes any corporation, business or
other entity that has been formed by, or for the benefit of, a senior foreign political figure.
The "immediate family" of a senior foreign political figure typically includes the figure's par-
ents, siblings, spouse, children, and in-laws.
A "close associate" of a senior foreign political figure is a person who is widely and publicly
known to maintain an unusually close relationship with the senior foreign political figure, and
includes a person who is in a position to conduct substantial domestic and international finan-
cial transactions on behalf of the senior foreign political figure.
In conjunction with financial institutions' policies, practices, and procedures financial
institutions are encouraged to employ the practices set forth in the guidance when estab-
lishing and maintaining a business relationship with a covered person.
1. Ascertain the Identity of the Account Holder and the Account's Beneficial Owner
If, during the normal account opening, maintenance or compliance procedures with re-
gard to private banking or other applicable accounts, a financial institution ascertains in-
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formation indicating that the beneficial owner of the account may be a covered person, the
institution should undertake reasonable efforts to determine whether, in fact, a covered
person holds or will hold a beneficial interest in the account. If, after making a reasonable
effort to make this determination, substantial doubt remains as to whether a covered person
holds a beneficial interest in the account, the financial institution may refuse to open the
account if the institution is not able to determine the capacity in which, and on whose
behalf the proposed account holder is acting.
If a financial institution is requested to open an account for a covered person who comes
from a "secrecy jurisdiction," the financial institution should require the covered person to
provide the information that the institution typically collects to identify the client and his/
her source of funds or wealth at the outset of the relationship, and to waive any secrecy
protections provided by local law so that the institution is able to obtain the information
that the institution typically collects when opening an account for a U.S. resident. A secrecy
jurisdiction is considered a country or territory that, among other things, does not partici-
pate in international counter-money laundering information sharing arrangements or,
either by law or practice, allows account holders to forbid financial institutions from co-
operating with international efforts to obtain account information as part of an official
investigation.
2. Obtain Adequate Documentation on the Covered Person
When establishing a business relationship with a covered person, the financial institution
should obtain from the person (or others working on his or her behalf) documentation
adequate to identify the covered person, and take reasonable steps to assess the covered
person's business reputation.
3. Understand the Covered Person's Anticipated Account Activity
When establishing an account for a covered person, the financial institution should doc-
ument the purpose for opening the account and the anticipated account activity, and take
reasonable steps to determine whether the covered person has any legitimate business or
investment activity in the United States that would make having an account in the United
States a natural occurrence.
4. Determine the Covered Person's Source of Wealth and Funds
Each financial institution requested to establish an account for a covered person should
undertake reasonable efforts to determine the source of the covered person's wealth, in-
cluding the economic activities that generated the covered person's wealth, and the course
of particular funds involved in establishing the relationship. The institution should take
reasonable steps to determine the official salary and compensation of the covered persons
as well as the individual's known legitimate sources of wealth apart from his or her official
position.
5. Apply Additional Oversight to the Covered Person's Account
The decision to accept or reject establishing an account for a covered person should
directly involve a more senior level of management than is typically involved in decisions
regarding account opening. The institution should record all material decisions taken in
the course of establishing an account for the covered person. An institution with such
an account for a covered person should review annually, or more frequently as events
dictate, each such covered person's account to determine whether to continue doing busi-
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ness with the covered person, including consideration of pertinent account activity and
documentation.
When a financial institution conducts transactions for or on behalf of covered persons,
it should be alert to features of transactions that are indicative of transactions that may
involve the proceeds of foreign official corruption. The guidance sets forth a non-exhaustive
list of potentially questionable or suspicious activities to illustrate the sort of transactions
involving covered persons that often will warrant enhanced scrutiny that do not replace,
supersede, or supplant financial institutions' legal obligations regarding potentially suspi-
cious transactions generally.
In addition to a financial institution's existing information sources, fourteen sources of
information are given that may assist financial institutions in determining whether to con-
duct business with an individual who may be a covered person, and in determining whether
such a person may be engaging in transactions that may involve proceeds derived from
official corruption (e.g., the annual U.S. National Money Laundering Strategy, FinCEN
advisories and publications, the evaluations of the annual International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report, and annual Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency International).
The guidance provides sophisticated means to ascertain and deal with investments by
senior political figures, their families, and their agents. It will help combat the laundering
of proceeds by corrupt political figures. It will also complicate due diligence for financial
institutions. One of the initial responses is likely to be the "balloon effect," whereby covered
political figures will move their money to financial intermediaries in the United States or
elsewhere that are not covered by the guidance. This in turn will lead the international
community to campaign against those financial intermediaries and/or countries not covered,
especially the smaller jurisdictions that do not have membership in the international or-
ganizations or entities (e.g., FATF) making decisions.
F. CASE LAW: EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING LAWS
On November 30, 1999, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
applied U.S. money laundering laws extraterritorially, marking the second reported decision
applying such laws extraterritorially in United States v. Approximately $24,829,681.80 in
Funds (Plus Interest).99 In upholding the money laundering conviction for a wire fraud pred-
icate, the court ruled that the U.S. money laundering laws need not involve actual physical
activity within the United States and a person may act from abroad within the United States
"electronically or otherwise." 00 In this case, the defendant started a transfer of funds from
New Orleans to London while he was in the United Kingdom.'0 1
V. Summary and Conclusion
At the start of the new millennium most jurisdictions have enacted anti-money laundering
regimes. However, the substance, procedure, and resources of the regimes vary widely, and
large gaps enable transnational criminals to launder money by taking advantage of the
99. See United States v. Approx. $24,829,681.80, U.S. Dist. Ct. S.D.N.Y., 98 Civ. 2862 (LMM), 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18499 (Nov. 29, 1999).
100. Id.
101. See id. at 4.
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differences in the laws and gaps in international cooperation. Indeed, many sophisticated
criminals conduct their criminal activities, including the movement of their money, in an
increasingly borderless world. Whether they are producing and distributing drugs, smug-
gling arms, aliens, endangered species, or perpetrating different frauds, they need not leave
their house or town, especially if they use modern technologies. They can employ their
own intelligence to learn of the latest anti-money laundering laws and techniques, use
multiple types of communication, encryption to safeguard the privacy of their communi-
cations, and use a pyramid of employees based on a franchise system to minimize their
capital expenditures and business and criminal risks.
Criminals utilize alternative banking systems, such as offshore financial centers, the Co-
lombian black market peso exchange system, the non-bank financial sector, cyber-methods,
free trade zones, secrecy, and intermediary vehicles to conceal, segregate, impose multiple
entities, and deter identification and investigation of their money movement methods.
Criminals continue to increase the smuggling of criminal cash from countries for placement
into financial systems abroad, often taking advantage of many European and Western
Hemisphere jurisdictions that have no cross-border records tracking the movement of cash.
Money launderers increasingly use non-financial businesses or professionals related to
banking institutions. They obtain the assistance of professionals, such as accountants, no-
taries, lawyers, real estate agents, and agents for the purchase and sale of luxury items,
precious metals, and consumer durables, textiles and other products involved in the import-
export trade.
The use of private banking facilities and public figure accounts in banks and fiduciary
entities enable criminals and their agents to enter the international financial system without
subjecting themselves to the normal know-your-customer, suspicious transactions report-
ing, and other due diligence that may impede the laundering of crime proceeds.
The emphasis at the start of the millennium on the strengthening of the emerging in-
ternational money movement enforcement regime is increasingly on implementation and
enforcement. On universal, regional, and subregional levels, international organizations
focus on multilateral evaluations and even imposing sanctions on jurisdictions not comply-
ing with the anti-money laundering standards.
A major focus of anti-money laundering enforcement will be against non-complying
countries, especially official financial centers (OFC). Indeed, the United Nations, the
OECD, the FATF, the Basle Group, the multilateral development banks, and the regional
organizations, such as the EU and OAS, all have programs to combat the pernicious aspects
of improperly regulated financial products and service providers from OFCs. In the Western
Hemisphere, the emphasis to exert pressure on OFCs is starting to bear fruit. The advisories
issued by the United States and Britain against Antigua and Barbuda have resulted in
amendments to the Antiguan anti-money laundering laws, enforcement actions against
some of the offending financial institutions and their owners, and increased resources to
anti-money laundering and financial supervisory initiatives. Similarly, the hiring of new
staff in St. Vincent and the Grenadines indicates that the anti-money movement enforce-
ment initiatives have gotten the latter's attention. While several Caribbean governments
have opposed some of the initiatives, none of them have taken meaningful legal action. The
Antiguan government's threat to initiate action in the U.N. or World Trade Organization
is the first threatened action.
The private sector will be challenged to extend their due diligence programs, anticipate
and respond promptly to prevent the use of their entities for diverse global money laun-
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dering, and to undertake new anti-money laundering due diligence requirements so as to
avoid criminal and regulatory problems, yet maintain and adjust their business practices to
stay competitive. Increasingly, partnerships between the private sector and governments
and international organizations are the order of the day. The response of the private sector
to the new measures of international organizations will determine the impact on and re-
action by targeted jurisdictions. For instance, on August 5, 2000, Stanley "Stalky" John, a
St. Vincent attorney who does offshore work, stated that New York banks are requesting
Vincentian individuals and corporations holding accounts to travel to New York in order
for the banks to verify their ownership in the accounts. Mr. John explained that the veri-
fication procedure resulted from the fact that the U.S. government has issued financial
advisories against St. Vincent. °2 Such additional due diligence by banks and financial in-
stitutions in OECD or even G-7 countries is likely to trigger a response in the offshore
financial centers.
Professionals advising clients will have to advise them on the significantly changed en-
vironment of financial confidentiality and the ability and routine of governments to co-
operate on criminal enforcement over a wide range of matters. Increasingly, governments
and international organizations are prioritizing tax administration, including collection,
good governance, and transparency in the regulation of financial services, including finan-
cial institutions and service providers.
The increasing use of black lists by international organizations (e.g., OECD Harmful
Tax Competition and the FATF) and governments (e.g., Clinton budget proposal on iden-
tifying tax havens) will require professional advisers and their clients to become more se-
lective in the jurisdictions in which they base their entities, their residency, and their trans-
actions. Professional advisers in countries such as Britain must be ever more diligent on
issues of whether their clients have fulfilled their tax obligations.
Governments with large offshore jurisdictions must also choose. Mature and diversified
financial sectors, such as the Cayman Islands, can emphasize their sophisticated and insti-
tutionalized business at the expense of servicing individuals who require strict confidenti-
ality. Some of the newer jurisdictions do not have the luxury of making the trade-off. Other
jurisdictions may decide that the cost of all the new compliance may not be worth empha-
sizing financial services or at least certain products (e.g., see the mention by Secretary
Summers of economic nationality programs'03). To the extent international organizations
and governments influence offshore jurisdictions to eliminate certain products, the choice
of professional advisors and their clients becomes more restricted and the cost of certain
mechanisms increases. In fact, one of the increased risks for offshore trust advising is the
potential risk for enforcement difficulties due to the enormous amount of new laws, reg-
ulations, enforcement actions, and attention devoted to certain products, transactions, and
jurisdictions. To be sure, professional advisers, their clients, policymakers, and other inter-
ested persons live in interesting times.
The simultaneous implementation of initiatives by the OECD, the FATE and the FSF
clearly reflects the rise of international governmental organizations and related groups.' °4
102. For more information, see Antigua and Barbuda Private Sector Chides Gov't, CARiBBEAN NEws AGENCY,
Aug. 5, 2000, available at http://www.cananews.com/cbi/news.shtnl.
103. Available at http://www.j-bradford-delong.net/Politics/SummersSGE.htnl.
104. This ending appears at the conclusion of an article by this author, entitled The OECD Report Identifying
Harmfil Tax Practices and Tax Havens Solidifies the Momentum of the Harmful Tax Competition Initiative, 29 TAx
MGMT INr'LJ. 521-530 (July 28, 2000).
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Globalization will continue to underscore the prioritization of the new international finan-
cial architecture (NIFA) and corporate governance. As world markets converge and mul-
tinational firms continue to cross-invest into other financial and service sectors, the world
will increasingly need better institutional decision-making, better transparency, better se-
quencing in the liberalization process, and a more secure legal foundation. The crosscur-
rents and especially the strong and fluid international initiatives are resulting in a new
international financial architecture.O0 The early stages of the emergence of the NIFA have
brought a web of interlinked "quasi-legal, global standards""" that international govern-
mental organizations are developing to minimize the bumps in globalization brought by
the contagion from the Asian and other regional crises. Until the soft law standards become
hard law, taxpayers, nation-states, multinational corporations, and other interested persons
necessarily must conduct their affairs in increasingly gray areas. The new risks brought by
the fluidity of the soft law standards implemented with increasing countermeasures will
require more planning and attention to diverse legal and regulatory standards. Welcome to
the new millennium!
105. See Joseph J. Norton, A "New International FinancialArchitecture?"--Reflections on the Possible Law-Based
Dimension, 33 INT'L LAw. 891, 891-92 (1999).
106. Id.
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